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GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE AGE
OF TERROR
Ideas, Domestic Politics, and the International System of States
Donald Abenheim
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What accounts for the rift between Washington and Berlin at present? No single cause emerges from an examination of this situation that hopes to go beyond
the facile, reactive, if not jingoistic, analyses of the chattering classes in Berlin
and Washington. Rather, the current strain is wrought of a convergence of
forces, complicating manifestations of history, ideology, experience, and ambition that have always swirled around the German-American relationship, however inchoately. For a variety of reasons, these factors have coalesced to
exacerbate tensions and produce a troubling reaction in the last several months
since the American coalition against terror marched to war, first in Afghanistan
and then in Iraq. This article examines these complicating factors and the circumstances that have made them so virulent of late.
The following focuses on the German side of the problem, first tracing the
role of ideas in German politics and society, the ideological framework on which
2
the current debate is built. Simply put, in the first instance, since the origins of
such ideas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there have endured mutually negative images in Germany and the United States as concerns politics, soci3
ety, and culture among political elites; these well-worn negative images have
taken on a new virulence in the present crisis because of the upswing in nationalist sentiment on both sides of the Atlantic in the wake of Bin Ladenist terror.
Secondly, these ideas interact with domestic political figures and factors that, in
the German case, have been particularly important in the transformation of external relations since the waning phase of the first Gerhard Schröder cabinet af4
ter 11 September 2001. That is, Schröder is very different from Helmut Kohl as
concerns German-American relations, and his source of power and influence in
German politics differs from those of his Atlanticist predecessors. Thus, the
analysis here turns to the role of German domestic politics in Berlin’s external
policy today, developments that have not always met with much understanding
among foreign policy elites on these shores.
Third, there is the matter of security and defense policy in Germany, particularly the German aversion to extraterritorial operations—an aversion that, although such policy has given way to a much more global orientation since 1990,
continues to brake German enthusiasm for sending soldiers overseas compared to,
5
say, the British and French. As we shall see, in the formation of security and defense
policy in Germany and the United States, the forces dubious about U.S. diplomacy
and strategy in Germany find their echo, as it were, in those figures and institutions
6
skeptical of the phenomena recently caricatured by Robert Kagan.
Finally, the article takes up the implications for the future of a continuing or
worsening German-American split. This issue is central to the emergence of
“New Europe” versus “Old Europe” and the long-term effects of this diplomatic
revolution in the wake of 11 September 2001.
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FROM ENTENTE TO CONFLICT
The U.S.-German amity that now seems so precarious is hard won and vitally
7
important to the United States and to the world. The security and defense ties
between Washington and Bonn, and later Berlin, represented the success of
statecraft that for the first time in modern history forged a durable Central European bond to the Anglo-Saxon and Atlantic realm, a connection that had been
8
impossible in the years from 1848 until 1949. Whereas the rise of German
might in the era 1870–1939 was a leading source of concern for American makers of policy in the era of the world wars, the integration of German power into
the international system of states became a symbol of peace and stability in the
years from 1945 until 1990. It also drove the reconstruction and reorientation of
Western Europe, which formed a reliable—and reliably democratic—ally for the
9
United States during and after the Cold War.
The high point of the German-American relationship came in May 1989, as
the border that divided Germany and Europe first began to hemorrhage denizens of the East bloc intent on a better life in the West. In the Rhineland city of
Mainz, the first President Bush gave a speech in which he identified the United
States and the Federal Republic as “Partners in Leadership” and inaugurated an
era of good feeling that obtained through October 1990 and German unifica10
tion. The events of this period and G. H. W. Bush’s estimation of the GermanAmerican bond marked a fitting conclusion to the Cold War and the century of
world wars.
Of course, for all the mutual esteem that Germany and the United States fostered for each other in the years after World War II, the leaders of both countries
endured in their personal diplomacy episodes of strife and discord that affected
German-American relations. In the first years of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the Americans wrongly thought that Kurt Schumacher, the leader
of the socialist opposition to Konrad Adenauer’s Atlantic statecraft, was a na11
tionalist holdover, if not a neo-Nazi. After the climax of the Berlin crisis in the
summer of 1961, Adenauer believed that John Kennedy had lurched away from
the Atlantic statecraft and nuclear strategy of the Eisenhower administration;
12
Adenauer himself shifted toward Charles de Gaulle at the end of his tenure.
Ludwig Erhard’s chancellorship ended abruptly in 1966, partly as a result of
Lyndon Johnson’s overbearing attempts to make Germany shoulder additional
13
burdens of Western defense in the era of the Indochina war. Richard Nixon and
Henry Kissinger believed that Willy Brandt ventured too far toward Moscow in
1969–70 with his abandonment of Adenauer’s Cold War policies toward Central
14
and Eastern Europe. Helmut Schmidt and Jimmy Carter, despite their shared
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left-of-center political views, disagreed sharply about the means and ends of
15
North Atlantic Treaty Organization strategy in the second half of the 1970s.
Still, clashes of personality and vision did not disturb the depths of GermanAmerican affinity. Not so very long ago, news reports carried images of Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Bill Clinton, two large men meeting over
heart-attack-inducing plates of fettuccini in Georgetown as they consolidated
the gains of statecraft that had emerged from the end of the Cold War. There and
later, amid the organ-meat-oriented delicacies of Kohl’s home region, the Palatinate, the conservative German leader and the Democratic American president
later expanded NATO and led German-American diplomacy to new heights of
cooperation and effectiveness. It may be, though, that these feasts heralded the
last hurrah of the comfortable transatlantic entente.
The present condition of the German-American connection surely contrasts
with the recent, but seemingly long gone, past. The German chancellor waged a
populist campaign against U.S. foreign policy to win reelection in 2002. American and German diplomats have been on opposite sides of the green felt tables at
the United Nations Security Council and the North Atlantic Council amid
name-calling and feats of diplomatic sleight of hand that do no honor to the
memory of Dean Acheson, Konrad Adenauer, or Lucius Clay. A senior American
official has grouped Germany with Libya and Cuba as examples of countries opposed to U.S. interests. Other voices are calling for boycotts of German goods—
demands echoed in sporadic, informal refusals by German companies to supply
goods to the U.S. market—or punitive acts of defense “realignment” that will
greatly weaken the German-American bond. Beyond giving vent to frustrations
at a relationship gone seriously awry, such rhetoric augurs a troubled future.
Moreover, these pronouncements, as well as the yellow journalism of the tabloid
electronic press, recall the escalation of words and events between the sinking of
the Lusitania in the spring of 1915 and the U.S. entry into World War I in 1917.
The present breakdown in German-American relations began to take shape
after the initial shock of September 2001 dissipated and U.S. armed forces counterattacked the terror network in the Hindu Kush; at the same time the United
States gave short shrift to any substantial NATO support in the Afghan operation, putatively as a means of avoiding the perceived setbacks of the 1999 NATO
campaign in Kosovo. This phase has reinvigorated in part of the American body
politic an anti-European and anti-German feeling not seen for decades, doing at
the same time much the same among certain elites in Germany who have been
anti-American in times past, notably from the mid-1960s until the early 1980s.
If this development had antecedents in the past, however, never did these phenomena cross the threshold in bilateral relations that was traversed in 2002.
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IDEAS AND THEIR CONFLUENCE IN GERMAN
DOMESTIC POLITICS
This writer was in Slovenia on 11 September 2001, as part of the construction
of what in other circles is now called “New Europe.” While waiting to return to
the United States from Vienna, he watched the reactions of people in Central
Europe to the calamity here. One saw sympathy for America, the victim, and
fear of further attacks targeting other Western powers—a combination that
led to expressions of solidarity that echoed the North Atlantic Council’s invoking of Article V of the NATO pact within hours of the attack. Such compassion
was surely genuine, but in some sectors other sentiments soon emerged. From
the earliest moments of the aftermath, one also saw the beginnings of misunderstanding based on old anti-American prejudices in both the popular discourse and political formulations of certain elites and makers of opinion. This
misapprehension concerns the inability of certain Germans to interpret fully
American history and U.S. ideas about policy and war that appear to contradict what has become, for more than a few members of the present generation
of power holders in Germany, a dogma of peace in all circumstances. Professor
Jeffrey Herf has best described this phenomenon as, first, an underestimation
among the German left of the vices of appeasement in the era 1933–39—that
is, the inability to understand the failures of the West to preempt the Nazi re16
gime and the high price the world was to pay; and second, as the tendency to
engage in a form of Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik (“transformation through proximity,” a term coined in 1963 by Brandt’s press spokesman, Egon Bahr) in every
conceivable diplomatic situation, whether such statecraft is warranted or not.
The present German leadership views events inflexibly in terms of its own dis17
tinct ideological legacy.
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder holds office as a Social Democrat, a
representative of Germany’s largest center-left party, in coalition with the Green
Party, the latter having emerged in the political and social upheaval of the late
1960s and 1970s, and now part of the political establishment. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) is also the country’s oldest political party, in the sense that its
members today trace their direct organizational and ideological roots to the
middle of the nineteenth century, the era of Bismarck’s German unification and
the nation’s tumultuous first republican experiment. The SPD is also the party
that most stoutly resisted the Nazi march to power in 1930–33. It is a party with a
strong pacifist tradition, or at least a deep skepticism about the use of armed
force. Nonetheless, in the 1950s and 1960s, key Social Democratic figures had
signal roles in the establishment of a new army in the FRG. In no small part because of the party’s experiences with the totalitarian left both before and after
the Nazi regime, the SPD, unlike many European socialist parties, actively
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resisted communism before 1933 and after 1945, particularly in the form of parties led more or less openly from Moscow during the Cold War.
At the same time, however, the party remained dubious of the free market, seeing itself as the arbiter of a “third path” to resolve the tensions of capital and labor,
as well as the geopolitical conflict between the capitalist West and the totalitarian
East. Before and after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949,
this habit of thought translated to resistance to American antisocialist influences
in western Germany, while the new center-right party, the Christian Democratic
Union, at pains to distinguish itself from the reactionary and nationalist tradition
of the prewar right, adopted a strong, pro-American stance. Helmut Kohl represented such policy from 1982 until 1998, as does the present leader of the opposition, Angela Merkel. The fondest Social Democratic notions of an independent,
neutral Germany, forging a middle way between great powers, endure in the SPD’s
theoretical substance today. At the same time, the anti-Soviet, pro-Atlanticist
wing of the SPD that held sway from the end of the 1950s until the early 1980s—
best represented by the career of Helmut Schmidt (chancellor 1974–82)—has no
effective successors in Schröder’s cabinet or in the left-of-center camp of German
politics as a whole.
In this vein, the present German-American troubles might be said to have
their distant origins a quarter of a century ago when Helmut Schmidt passed the
apogee of his power and many of the personalities on both sides of the present
German-American tensions perhaps first developed antipathies for one another.
These developments transpired in the second half of the 1970s, amid the collapse of superpower détente and the revival of the Cold War in 1979–80, the period of the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the
election of Ronald Reagan. Before the present epoch of terror, then, the potential
for a German-American clash came into starkest relief during the debates between 1977 and 1987 about the deployment of the so-called Euromissiles,
18
NATO’s response to Soviet nuclear blackmail. The answer of the German left to
such statecraft reflected a misreading of the 1930s by pro-détente forces transmuted into the late 1970s and early 1980s. German advocates of an opening to
Moscow misunderstood the fact that the Soviet attempt to overawe the West
with the SS-20 medium-range rocket was born of motives that brooked no compromise. Further, the far left in Germany failed to appreciate the efficacy of the
North Atlantic strategy of the dual-track approach of the Harmel doctrine—
which, beginning in December 1967 and continuing until 1989, fostered a reduction of East-West tensions but also sufficient NATO defense in the face of the
19
Soviet theater and strategic buildup. The sudden end of the Cold War obviated
the debate amid national unification in peace, but the return of war to Europe
and elsewhere in the 1990s revealed that the discordance of thinking about force
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and statecraft had hardly vanished. Despite what seems to be consensus in the
FRG on the Schröder cabinet’s refusal to back the “coalition of the willing” in the
war against Iraq, this German conflict about force and statecraft has grown far
more intense since 11 September and will likely persist in the wake of the annihi20
lation of the Iraqi armed forces in March–April 2003.
This phenomenon of a far left that can conceive of statecraft only with an explicit critique of U.S. policy of strength has a Doppelgänger in a strain in American political thought that is ascendant at the moment. The opposite of an
anti-American Gerhard Schröder is the anti-European and especially antiGerman-socialist dogma that might be said to exist among the foreign-policy
21
elites of the American right. Beyond traditional doubts in some U.S. quarters
about European and German socialists, or outright opposition to them, a
Europhobic school of thought has operated in part of the American foreign-policy
22
elite since at least the early 1970s. This group originally doubted the goals of Willy
Brandt’s statecraft and later deplored any lessening of tension with the Warsaw
Pact—which, in their view, could only lead to the “Finlandization” of Western Eu23
rope. This school also worried in 1983–84 that a red-green coalition would result
in a new diplomacy à la Tauroggen and Rapallo, with the FRG marching alongside
24
the USSR against the West. Surely the work of Robert Kagan, which asserts unbridgeable ideological differences between Europe and the United States—that is,
the pithy Venus-and-Mars analogy of strategic geography—takes more than a page
25
from the book of these Europhobes and the strategic debates of their day.
In other words, Germany’s leftist anti-Americanism collides in the United
States with rightist anti-German or anti–continental European sentiments in
the current debate over grand strategy. These two notions cause an escalatory
diplomatic blow and counterblow of name-calling and invective, as witnessed in
26
the months before the outbreak of war in late March 2003.
THE PRIMACY OF DOMESTIC POLITICS IN GERMANY’S
FOREIGN POLICY
With the beginning of the new century, the political burdens arising from the
conjuncture of German unification and weaknesses of the German social market economy (which were detectable even before 1989) became ever more
daunting. The tasks of economic and social renewal preoccupy the national
leadership amid a widespread sense of social and political entropy and crisis.
These concerns receive little or no sympathetic analysis among political elites in
the United States, who dismiss the advent of peace along the European Cold War
battlements and the extension of NATO and the European Union as a sideshow
at best. This circumstance leaves Atlantic-minded Germans feeling abandoned
by their elder sibling, the United States.
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In this vein, for instance, the catastrophic floods of summer 2002 in the five
new federal states only served to make Germans more concentrated on their
own affairs versus the wider world. Much like the Chernobyl explosion of 1986,
the event accentuated the importance of ecological international relations—
that is, the floods in Dresden seemed an augur of global warming, a threat more
palpable than al-Qa‘ida kamikazes in jetliners. More enduringly, Schröder’s attention is dominated by Germany’s economic straits, as the country comes to resemble 1970s Britain before the Thatcherite free-market coup de main. In the
last decade, the economic growth rate in Germany has averaged 1.6 percent—
27
the rate in 2002 was a dismal 0.2 percent. Officially, unemployment hovers
near 12 percent, a figure that includes neither the underemployed nor women
who, though now jobless, can be counted as housewives. In the eastern part of
the country, where workers by law earn no more than 80 percent of the wage that
a western German worker makes for the same job, the unemployment rate is
much higher, and disaffection for the state and society, expressed through extreme politics and violent gang activity, runs concomitantly high.
It goes without saying, then, that the German leadership has plenty to worry
about at home. Interestingly, the war in Iraq may ultimately help ease Germany’s
economic woes, as it might activate an “exception clause” in the European
Union’s Stability and Growth Pact, which the Germans could cite as a reason for
suspending strict criteria that the Federal Republic cannot meet in its current condition. Under the exception clause, hefty fines for recent violations would be dismissed, and the way for increased deficit spending to spur the economy would be
28
cleared. Nonetheless, the head of Germany’s labor office, a Social Democrat, in29
sists that the war and “geopolitical uncertainty” are hindering recovery.
The political cast of the wartime economic analysis in Germany continues the
basic domestic-political fact of anti-Americanism as a campaign issue. Chancellor Schröder stood for reelection in the summer of 2002. His once-popular cabinet had by then become enfeebled by the national economic sclerosis, unable
and increasingly unwilling to free itself from the vise grip of the trade-union
movement, where many cabinet members found their ideological home, to say
nothing of their electoral support. However, the economy—particularly the dramatic policy initiatives that the moribund German market would require—made
for difficult contests for politicians interested in being all things to all voters.
As the German election campaign took shape—and as the focus of U.S.
counterterror strategy shifted from the Afghan expedition against the Taliban
and al-Qa‘ida to preparations for the military overthrow of the Saddam Hussein
regime—the SPD also found itself circumscribed by the pacifism of its coalition
partners. These partners were the Green Party and the so-called Party of German Socialism (PDS), the Stalinist successor to the former communist party of
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the German Democratic Republic. The PDS kept a strong hold on voters’ hearts
and minds in the eastern part of the country—in part by promising the
anti-American peace platform that the East German leaders had always talked
about but never delivered.
Thus, when Schröder’s challenger from the center right, Edmund Stoiber, the
Bavarian minister-president (governor), asserted on the campaign stump that
Germany should support the United States against Iraq in the war on terrorism,
Schröder found himself another issue. Schröder’s camp seized on Stoiber’s position to exploit several factors in domestic politics. With his ever more strident
expressions of opposition to U.S. strategy, the incumbent chancellor appealed to
pacifists and to skeptics of Germany’s Western orientation in the ex-GDR. Further, he put the pro-American heirs of Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl on
the defensive and, either by accident or by design, emboldened the fringe right
and left in their latent anti-American phobias. At the climax of the September
campaign Schröder’s justice minister, Herta Däubler-Gmelin, long critical of the
administration of justice in the United States, in a talk to union members in the
southwestern German state of Baden-Württemberg likened the American president to Adolf Hitler—just one week after the first anniversary of the 11 September
30
attacks. Her comments brought about her resignation from the Schröder cabinet
immediately after he won reelection, but her swift departure did nothing to diminish the escalation of vitriol and bad feeling between Berlin and Washington.
Herein reemerged the dilemma of German socialism and state power, force
and statecraft, that has operated since the end of the nineteenth century. Once
more, then, the unhappy experience of German socialists with armed power and
the international system loomed within domestic politics. Surely in years to
come the Schröder election strategy of 2002 and its attendant effects will stand
31
alongside earlier episodes that tore the SPD apart. The most recent of these ultimately self-destructive allergic reactions to the use of armed force occurred
when the left wing of the SPD sandbagged Helmut Schmidt over NATO strategy
in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. When the dust and rhetoric settled, the Social Democrats no longer held the chancellor’s office and the new German leaders faced some long-term repair work to the German image abroad, particularly
in the eyes of the U.S. policy elite. Schröder’s version of the new era, however,
might yet prove to be even more profound in its long-term effects.
SECURITY AFFAIRS IN THE GERMAN VIEW
The November 2002 North Atlantic Council summit in Prague invited seven
“Partnership for Peace”/Membership Action Plan countries to accede to NATO.
To the extent that the meeting played out cordially, it falsely presaged a lull in the
name-calling between Washington and Berlin. However, the American
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rejoinder to the Schröder election campaign soon followed; a senior Washington official compared Germany’s resistance to U.S. policy on Iraq (alongside that
of France in the UN Security Council) to the actions of such rogue states as
Libya and Cuba. Not to be outdone, Europe-bashers in Congress called for the
boycott of German goods as well as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from that
country. The Federal Republic, along with France, constituted, in the view of
certain senior American officials, “Old Europe,” an epithet intended to highlight
a disparity with the newly democratic nations of Central and Eastern Europe,
32
which constituted a “New Europe.” This “other” continent formed a pillar of
the U.S.-led coalition against terror and weapons of mass destruction. To underscore this new diplomacy the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and several Central
and Eastern European countries declared their support for the U.S. campaign
33
against Iraq in the Wall Street Journal of 30 January 2003. Henceforth Madrid,
Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, and Warsaw would be the leading European partners of the United States. As the military buildup against Iraq gained speed in
late February 2003, an American effort within the North Atlantic Council to
provide for the collective defense of Turkey as well as the protection of facilities
in Western Europe prompted a nonconsensus demarche by Belgium, France,
34
and Germany. This diplomatic impasse briefly appeared to herald the final collapse of the 1949 Washington Treaty establishing NATO and the success of
French statecraft to detach the Federal Republic of Germany from its Atlantic
foundations and erect an anti-Anglo-Saxon continental bloc.
The crux of the problem for the Germans lies in the knotted issues that attend
combat outside their borders, as well as the abhorrence of war by the body politic and nearly all foreign-policy elites, who regard armed conflict solely in terms
of futile tragedy. The anti-Washington and anti-London diplomacy visible in
Berlin and Paris in the first weeks of 2003 derived most immediately from the
collapse of transatlantic consensus about terror and weapons of mass destruction—in addition to the increasing personal antipathy between Schröder and
Bush. However, German refusal to be dragged into other people’s fights is proverbial, going back to Bismarck and his attempts in 1879–88 to keep the second
German Empire out of the Habsburg adventures in the Balkans that would have
35
alienated Petersburg and thus shattered Bismarck’s European system. Even in
1914–18 and 1939–42 there remained a certain grand strategic misunderstanding or indifference to areas beyond continental Europe narrowly defined (that is,
the so-called Kontinentalblick), notwithstanding the Flottenverein (imperialist
Navy League) and Vaterlandspartei (wartime pre-Nazi Fatherland Party) war
aims of 1916 and Nazi propaganda of 1941.
Such indifference and caution reemerged in the Federal German leadership
after 1949. This policy was dictated by national division, as well as by the
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strategic conditions of the Cold War that impelled Bonn to keep the United
States and the United Kingdom linked to the defense of Central Europe but at
the same time to avoid French colonial warfare, later that of the United States, in
Indochina. Indeed, skepticism of what later was called “out of area” (a reference
to the geographical limits embodied in Article VI of the Washington Treaty) was
central to the defense clauses of the German constitution, the Basic Law, drafted
36
in the 1950s. The Basic Law banned the waging of a war of aggression, made
collective security through the United Nations the highest goal of statecraft, and
limited the mission of the armed forces to defense. Statements by the German
cabinet as recently as the early 1980s insisted that the Germans would stay out of
non–Article V contingencies and adhere to the NATO battle lines of the
Thuringian Salient and the North German Plain. Of course, at this same time,
the United States became increasingly engaged in the Middle East because of the
37
Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran and Leonid Brezhnev’s Afghanistan.
When the precursors of the first Gulf War occurred in the summer of 1990,
amid the process of German unity, the Kohl government watched the United
States withdraw a significant portion of its forces from the FRG and hurl them
into combat against Iraq, while the United Kingdom and France sent their soldiers to the Gulf as well. For their part, the Germans provided behind-the-scenes
logistical and financial support—measures that bestirred much domestic furor
38
about “out of area” adventures and a militarization of German foreign policy.
The next years saw a fight between the Kohl government’s interventionist interpretation of Article 24 and the SPD opposition’s constructionist adherence to
Article 87a—that is, the Bundeswehr exists solely for national defense in the narrowest sense. As the war in ex-Yugoslavia grew more awful, Germans appalled
first by Saddam Hussein’s missile bombardment of Israeli cities and now by
Slobodan Milosevic’s sieges of Vukovar and Sarajevo turned the political momentum toward an alteration of the constitutional status quo.
Finally, in the summer of 1994, the Federal German constitutional court de39
cided in favor of the Kohl cabinet. The “no to out of area” syndrome was abated
by a policy of gradual steps—from a hospital in Cambodia to the expeditionary
force in Somalia, to the German peacekeeping task in Bosnia, to the combat role
in Kosovo and its aftermath, and most recently, to the security-building phase of
40
the campaign in Afghanistan. The Bundeswehr of 2003 maintains some nine
thousand troops outside of Germany, which, granted the decline of its strength
since 1990, is a substantial number. Nonetheless, this accomplishment tends to
be denigrated by Americans who perpetually misunderstand, for partisan rea41
sons, such issues of defense-burden sharing.
This transformation of German security and defense to responsibilities beyond the horizons of Central Europe received little positive recognition in the
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United States, just as the social and economic burdens of national unification
42
have often been overlooked. In the view of some it is as if the management of
the FRG has failed, in its hostile takeover of a failed rust-belt industry, to treat its
newly acquired property with sufficient sangfroid. The West had won, and Francis
Fukuyama’s “end of history” had eventuated. Why did the Germans persist in
wringing their hands and nattering about the economic consequences of unification when a real, free-market liberal-democratic ally would, in a phrase, “just do it”?
In fact, German unification revived an old American habit to overestimate
and simultaneously underestimate—which is to say, generally to misunderstand—the situation of the Germans. This issue goes back to the era of Teddy
Roosevelt and Kaiser William II, whose conflicting attitudes about the Monroe
Doctrine and the fate of the Caribbean revealed this phenomenon of misunderstanding and overestimation of power.43
The syndrome continued through Franklin D. Roosevelt’s assumption, circa
late 1940, that the Germans would soon march on the Amazon Basin as a means
44
to strike at the United States. Similarly, during World War II, the U.S. side overestimated the ardor of Nazi Germany’s attempt to secure atomic weapons, and it
overboldly expected Hitler, the Waffen-SS, and the Hitler Youth to fight to the
death until 1948 in the Bavarian Alps. The American project of denazification in
1945–47 also proceeded from a serious misunderstanding of how German soci45
ety had operated in the Third Reich. Nothing symbolized such crossed purposes as the simultaneous war-crimes trials against German political and
military figures and hiring by the U.S. Army of German military officers to write
studies on how to fight a war against the Soviet Union (a project that proved a
46
prelude to the armament of the FRG).
When unification was at hand in 1989–90, there was impatience with the tentative, circle-and-sniff approach that German lawmakers took to assimilating
the erstwhile East. On the other hand, there arose, at least in certain quarters of
the chattering classes in 1989 and 1990, nightmare suspicions that a unified Germany would revert to the imperialist policy goals of Himmler’s SS Rasse- und
Siedlungshauptamt (SS Race and Settlement Office, home of the SS racial imperialists). In contrast to these fears was the reality of a policy of incremental
change in the Federal Republic of Germany’s force and statecraft, beginning in
the summer of 1990 and accelerating over the decade to come.
Such a process accorded fully with the pattern of German civil-military relations that took shape at the beginning of the 1950s and has obtained, perhaps,
until quite recently. That is, the formation of U.S. and Atlantic strategy has been
surprisingly open to German interests since 1948;47 its periodic major shifts (for
example, the armament of the FRG, the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into NATO strategy and force posture, the advent of Flexible Response, the
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diplomacy of unification in 1989–90) subsequently require the laborious for48
mation of consensus in German political parties and other groups. This process of consensus building usually progresses with less turbulence when
Germany’s external context—especially official American opinion—is clear and
stable. Where, as in the later half of 2002 and into the present, old tensions collide with new uncertainties, the immediate outcome has been less predictable.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY,
AND THE WORLD
One might conclude with the generalization that German-American relations
have gone off the rails in the age of terror, in part (but only in part) because of
the problematic state of politics and society in Germany as it affects external relations. Such a pronouncement does not suggest that all guilt rests with the
Schröder cabinet and the pie-eyed, if not wrongheaded, adherence by some German elites to the principles of Egon Bahr, laudable ideas in 1963 (when he was
press spokesman of West Berlin and soon to become a chief architect of Willy
Brandt’s Ostpolitik and a leading figure in SPD politics) that may be dysfunctional four decades later amid a radically changed international context. One
should be grateful that because the reality of a Volk in Waffen (nation at arms)
proved such a disaster in 1914–45, the Germans are dubious about the efficacy
of war. Only an abject disregard for the past allows serious irritation with the
contemporary German reluctance to take up arms in the wider world. Thus, the
Europhobes inside the Beltway who beat their drums of scorn do so for their
own amusement and domestic political profit, not to set sound policy for the
United States.
To be sure, the Schröder government, in the face of a stagnating society and
politics, has given in to the temptation to flirt with nationalist extremes. The
present German government appears to have forgotten the role of common
sense in sound diplomacy, as well as of the long view of statecraft in Central Europe. A more advised view argues for the simultaneous orientation of the FRG to
a peaceful Western Europe, including a Gaullist France, and also to the United
States and the Atlantic dimension. However, this analysis does not fully explain
the wreckage of U.S.-German relations since 2001.
The United States, particularly in the preemptive campaigns to come in the war
against its terrorist foes, must better perform the trick of evoking gratitude in
statecraft from Europeans while also instructing them in the vitality of U.S. interests. Since the 1999 NATO campaign against the Serbs in Kosovo, if not long before, the American school of thought that puts national interests first—and that
touts its refrain of “the mission defines the coalition”—has brought a return to the
bad habits and messy, if not brutal, customs of the Atlantic burden-sharing fights
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of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The difficult diplomacy about collective defense,
national prestige, nuclear and conventional arms, and balance of payments between
London, Washington, and Bonn that no doubt enraged people on both sides in
1963 may have been appropriate in the context of that year, just as Bahr’s idea of
détente may have been, as well. That was then, however. Since 11 September 2001
the postmodern revival of Lyndon Johnson’s burden-sharing headlock of a hapless
Ludwig Erhard has become excessive.
Such unhelpful practices, customary to the secondary, technical level of bilateral relations, must have their counterweight in statecraft that comprehends the
strengths as well as the limitations of military power and that assesses realistically the respective civil-military potential of each democratic nation. One must
grasp without illusion what a given country can and cannot do in the realm of
defense, in terms not just of force strength and hardware but also political and
social realities. Only thus can one avoid the exaggerations of over and underestimation, as have recently had such acrimonious effect. To be sure, this writer regrets that the Germans have not, and will not, increase their defense spending, as
they did in the years 1960–80. But one cannot expect the same performance on
this score from a now unified, but nonetheless self-preoccupied and encumbered, Germany as one can from a United States on the march. To embrace a punitive policy by which Germany, the most populous and important country in
Europe, should be outflanked by Spain and Poland may be an efficacious tactic
in the short term, but it will surely backfire over time. It will become increasingly
clear that something must operate to limit American global power; meanwhile,
what has been the fringe phenomenon of nationalism will intrude into the center of domestic German politics.
The present war against terrorism may have implications beyond the obvious—the collapsed World Trade Center and the toppled statues of Saddam
Hussein. If one is to believe the idea of new Europe versus old Europe, implying
the marginalization of Germany by the United States, the defense bond to Germany will decline. This contingency would mean a diplomatic revolution for
both Germany and the United States, a foreign relations scenario that was always
the subject of intellectual inquiry but never took on the life and depth that it
seems to have in the last year. A United States cut off from Germany and vice
versa, while the former somehow tenuously anchors itself more to the latter’s
neighbors (and victims of the nineteenth and twentieth century), may well reinforce baleful trends in the evolution in peace and security in Europe. This assertion reflects no criticism of Poles, Danes, or Czechs, or of the Romanians and
Bulgarians, either, who were victims of a different kind. The United States and
the entire project of Western liberal democracy need the newly democratized
states of Central and Eastern Europe. However, the U.S.-German bond
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continues to have a particular significance in this connection. Germany can
reach out to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and they respond in
kind, because of the Atlanticist foundation that has operated for more than a
half-century—such has been the central goal of American policy since 1945. Although it may sound peculiar in 2003 to those ignorant of the history of Europe,
Germany’s peace and security have relied on its bond to America and France simultaneously, much in the way that Prussia’s and later Germany’s good fortune
from 1815 until 1888 relied on the bond with czarist Russia. In the latter case, the
northern courts had been a force for stability and order, as well as peace of a
kind—a peace and an international system that, despite its faults, proved far
better than the fragmented European system that arose thereafter and culmi50
nated in world wars. The world order anchored by the U.S.-German relationship has integrated Germany into Europe without more bloodshed, brought the
transformation of communist Europe, and visited prosperity—and the political
and demographic stability that go with it—on a part of the world that could easily have found itself mired in the kind of enduring strife that tore asunder exYugoslavia and roils Israel today. There is rather more to lose here than Hummel
figurines and wooden nutcrackers in the tourist shops of GarmischPartenkirchen and the sticky French pastries at NATO headquarters in Brussels.
Indeed, the passing of the post-1945 order poses a vast question mark over
the brave new world of Machtpolitik and the vigorous pursuit of U.S. interests by
first strikes and punitive expeditions. Germany will be cut loose, no longer fully
settled in a complete European structure that can hold it. France, Belgium, and
Luxembourg plainly do not constitute the totality of Europe, and the new Europe of Prague, Budapest, Bratislava, Tallin, Sofia, and Bucharest cannot function sensibly—or democratically—without its central and western portions.
The danger exists that this new system, which appears to have lurched into existence through secondary causes, will face an enduring test of grand strategic effectiveness—that is, to provide a durable and lasting peace that has been the
criterion for the system crafted in the years after 1945.
This question of the grand strategic efficacy of the “coalition of the willing”
within the Euro-Atlantic sphere is the final issue, when one gets past the collective lunacy represented by boycotting German meat products, McDonald’s,
Coca-Cola. One need only recall that the collapse of the European system in the
1890s began with tariff fights over food and the like, disputes later instrumentalized by demagogues and zealots who railed against the limitations and
musty diplomacy of the old world. The results were appalling—two world wars, a
riven Europe, and all the opportunities that these circumstances cost. This insight
is one to bear in mind, even in the blast of war and the rapture of victory.
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